Abstract. Strong designated verifier signature shows that only designated user can verify the validity of the signature, others who have not signer's private key or verifier's private key cannot judge the signature's originator. Lee et al. presented a designated verifier signature scheme to realize signature's verification in the limited time. We demonstrate that Lee et al.'s scheme is insecure. Other legal users can forge valid signatures which convince designated verifier. In this paper, we show a concrete forgery attack of Lee et al.'s scheme and propose a new strong designated verifier signature scheme with time limit. In our new scheme, message and time stamp don't need transmit in public, which are embedded in signature via the method of signcryption. Only signer and designated verifier can recover those secrete values. Based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and Pre-Image Resistance assumption, it is proved that new strong designated verifier signature scheme can resist the ordinary forgery attack and replay attack, and enforce signature verification with time limit.
Introduction
In general, anyone can verify the validity of signature by using signer's public key. However, in some scenarios such as e-voting, e-payment and software licensing, maybe designers do not need this public verification but want only designated user to verify signature's validity. To solve the above application problem, Jakobsson et al. [1] introduced the concepts of designated verifier signature (DVS) and strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) in Eurocrypt'96. Designated verifier signature being a special type of digital signature provides message authentication without non-repudiation. Only designated verifier can confirm the authenticity of signature, but he/she cannot transfer the conviction to others since he/she can simulate the signature which is indistinguishable from the ones generated by the signer. In strong designated verifier signature scheme, the designated verifier must use * Corresponding author his/her private key as a crucial parameter to participate in the process of signature verification. None can verify the validity of the signature unless he holds the designated verifier's private key. Thus, strong designated verifier signature indeed realizes the design goal of designated verification. Saeednia et al. [2] gave the formal definition of strong designated verifier signature in 2003. Laguillaumie et al. [3] revisited the strong designated verifier signature in 2005. Since then, many designated verifier signature schemes and their variants were proposed, including multi-designated verifiers signature scheme [4] , identity -based designated verifier signature schemes [5] [6] [7] , certificateless-based designated verifier signature schemes [8] [9] [10] and universal designated verifier signature schemes [11] [12] .
In ordinary signature schemes, the message is required to be delivered together with the signature by plaintext. However, sometimes we want to transmit message secretly with the signature, which can be achieved by the signcryption. In 1996, Zheng et al. [13] proposed the first signcryption scheme which performed signature and encryption simultaneously in one logical step. The cost of the signcryption was lower than those required by the traditional sign-then-encrypt or encrypt-then-sign approach. After Zheng's signcryption, many signcryption schemes and applied schemes were proposed such as [14] [15] [16] . In signcryption, the receiver can recover the message from the ciphertext. It is useful for an application in which secret information is transmitted such as large messages, common information, dates, time stamps, identifiers and symmetrical keys. The signcryption is also applied in designated verifier signature. Saeednia et al. [2] proposed an efficient strong designated verifier signature scheme with signcryption firstly. The schemes of [17] [18] also apply this method to recover the message.
In some applied scenarios of strong designated verifier signature, it is required that the verification of signature must be completed within time limit, for example, e-payment or e-voting may demand designated verifier to verify the signature in 3-5 minutes, so we must limit the time range of verification and think how to transfer the time range to designated verifier secretly. Recently, Lee et al. [7] proposed a novel designated verifier signature scheme to overcome verification time out.
We show that, unfortunately, Lee et al.'s scheme is insecure. Any legal users can use his/her private key to generate a designated verifier signature. Moreover, this signature can convince the verifier Bob that it is generated by Alice, since the signature should be verified using Bob's private key but Bob is not an originator. Furthermore, because Alice can transfer the time stamp T to Bob publicly in Lee's scheme, the scheme did not resist replay attack of designate verifier signature.
In this paper, a concrete attack of Lee's scheme is shown, and a new strong designated verifier signature with time limit is proposed via method of signcryption. In our proposed scheme, the message and time stamp are transferred secretly, for these value are embedded in the signature. Only signer and designated verifier can recover them during the verification process. Based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem and PreImage Resistance assumption, it is proved that our new scheme is secure. It can resist the ordinary forgery attack and replay attack under the random oracle model, and enforce designated verifier signature verification with time limit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic concepts and security notion used in our scheme. Section 3 reviews Lee et al.'s scheme, analyzes scheme's security, and shows a concrete attack. Section 4 shows the flaws and reasons why other legal user can forge legally strong designated verifier signature which can be verified by designated verifier. Section 5 presents a new identity-based strong designated verifier signature. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
This section will introduce some fundamental background required in this paper, namely bilinear pairing, Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem, BDH Problem, the model and security properties of identitybased strong designated verifier signature scheme.
Bilinear Pairing and Complex Assumption
(1) Bilinear Pairing Suppose G1 is an additive group and G2 is a multiplicative group with the same prime order p. Let P be a generator of G1. Let e: G1G1G2 denote a bilinear map if it satisfies three properties as follows:
 Non-degeneracy: there exist P, Q G1 such that e (aP, bQ) 1 for a, bZq * .
 Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q) for P, QG1.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem Given elements P, aP, bPG1, for some unknown a, bZq * , it is hard to compute abP. The probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A can solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G1 with the successful probability: , it is hard to compute the element e (P, P) abc .
The probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A can solve the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in G1 with the success probability:
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For a given h in the output space of the one-way hash function, it is hard to find any message x with H(x) h.
Model of ID-based SDVS Scheme
In this subsection, we review the model of ID-based SDVS scheme. In general, an ID-based SDVS scheme is a tuple (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify and Simulation). The description of each algorithm is as follows [5] .
(1) Setup: It is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm which inputs a security parameter k and returns a master private key s, master public key Ppub=sP and a list of system parameters params, where s, Ppub is a key pair of Private Key Generator (PKG), Ppub and params are published, and s is kept secretly by the PKG.
(2) Extract: It is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm which inputs user's identity IDi, params and master private key s to return user's private key SIDi=sH(IDi) and user's public key QIDi=H(IDi).
(3) Sign: It is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm which inputs system parameters params, message m, the signer's private key SIDs and verifier's public key QIDv to return a designated verifier signature  on the message m.
(4) Verify: It is a deterministic polynomial algorithm which inputs system parameters params, signer's public key QIDs, verifier's private key SIDv, master public key Ppub and signature  on message m to output either accept or reject.
(5) Simulation: It is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm which inputs message m, system parameters params, signer's public key QIDs, verifier's private key SIDv and master public key Ppub to return a designated verifier's signature  ' on the message m. The signature  ' is simulated by verifier.
The following equations should be hold for the signatures  and  ': 
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Security properties of ID-based SDVS Scheme
The ID-based SDVS scheme should satisfy the following security properties:
(1) Correctness: If an ID-based SDVS is generated by signer, this signature must be verified by the Verify algorithm.
(2) Unforgeability: It is required that any third party other than the signer and the designated verifier cannot forge legal signatures unless a third party knows the private key of signer or verifier.
(3) Non-Transferability: It is required that the designated verifier can make an indistinguishable and legal signature, but he cannot convince a third party to believe this truth because the signature may be produced by the signer or the designated verifier.
(4) Strongness: The verifier's private key is required to be used while the designated verifier verifies signature's validity in the verification step.
(5) Source hiding: Given an ID-based SDVS on message m, it is hard for the original signer and the designated verifier to confirm this signature's producer, even if all of the private keys of all users are known.
Universal Forgery Attacks

Review of Lee et al.'s Scheme [7]
In this subsection, we briefly review Lee et al.'s IDbased designated verifier signature scheme. This scheme consists of five algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify and Simulation. The details of these algorithms are described as follows.
(1) Setup: The algorithm is run by PKG. 
Universal Forgery Attack
New SDVS Scheme
In this section, we propose a new strong designated verifier signature scheme with time limit by mean of the method of signcryption. The proposed scheme does not require transmitting message and time stamp in public, as these values can be recovered via the verification process. Owing to the message and time stamp embedded in designated verifier signature, anyone but signer and verifier cannot recover them. So our new scheme can resist replay attacks and legal user's forging attacks. The details of our new scheme's algorithm are represented as follows.
(1) Setup: Given a security parameter k, this algorithm performs as follows by PKG.
 Generates a cyclic additive group G1 and a cyclic multiplicative group G2 with prime order q, generator PG1 and defines bilinear pairing e: G1 G1 G2. 
Performance Analysis
This section mainly analyzes the security and the efficiency of the proposed scheme. According to Section 2, the ID-based SDVS scheme should satisfy the following properties: Correctness, Unforgeability, Non-Transferability, Strongness and Source hiding.
(1) Correctness.
The strong designated verifier signature (r,) can be verified by the designated verifier to show signature correctness as the following equation.
rH3(m||t)
We know e (SIDB, QIDA) e (QIDB, SIDA). Therefore, there exists the following equality:
H3(e (SIDB, QIDA) r (m||t)e (QIDB, SIDA) r )
H3(m||t)  r.
(2) Unforgeability. Supposing the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and the Pre-Image Resistance assumption of one-way hash function are hard, we will show the proposed ID-based strong designated verifier signature scheme is unforgeable to resist universal attack and replay attack. That is to say, if F computes the value W, he/she may have a chance to get the string m||t, which is impossible, however, because the value W is not transmitted in public. So anyone does not compute the value W except for the signer Alice holding SIDA and verifier Bob holding SIDB. Therefore, if F performs the replay attack, he/she can get the value m||t surely, for which the Pre-Image Resistance problem of one way hash function should be solved. In conclusion, because the adversary F doesn't know the private key of signer Alice or verifier Bob, he/she cannot realize the replay attack.
(3) Non-Transferability
Bob can use his/her private key to generate an indistinguishable and legal signature (r,) on message m, and it is hard to distinguish (r,) and (r,) for a third party, since the signature (r,) can be verified as follows:
Therefore, the designated verifier cannot make a third party to believe that the signature is produced by the signer or the designated verifier.
(4) Strongness.
While Bob verifies the validity of the signature, Bob's private key SIDB must be used in the Verify algorithm, otherwise W cannot be computed. So our new designated verifier signature scheme satisfies the strongness.
(5) Source hiding
In generally, both the signer Alice and the verifier Bob can generate indistinguishable and legal signatures, so it is hard to determine who generated signatures even if users know all the private keys of both Alice and Bob. The proposed ID-based strong designated verifier signature scheme satisfies this property.
(6) Efficiency
In this section, in terms of the security and computation cost, we compare our scheme with Lee et al.'s scheme which is the only one to satisfy the demand of time limit. We denote P as a computation of the pairing, M as a multiplication in G1, and E as an exponentiation in G2.
Table1. Comparison of SDVS schemes with time limit
Schemes
Security Sign Verify
Lee et al.'s scheme insecure 1M+1P
1M+1P
Our scheme secure 1E+1P 1E+1P
As shown in Table 1 , in the perspective of computation cost, our scheme is less efficient than Lee et al.'s scheme because our scheme needs exponentiation operations but Lee et al.'s scheme only needs multiplication operations which take less time than exponentiation operations. In the perspective of security, our scheme is secure but Lee et al.'s scheme is not. So our scheme strengthens the security but lowers the efficiency.
Conclusions
Recently, Lee et al. [7] proposed a novel strong designated verifier signature scheme. They claimed their scheme can resist the replay attack. Unfortunately, it is insecure. In this paper, we show a concrete replay attack to demonstrate that any users with legal private key can use their private key to generate a legal designated verifier signature. Moreover, this signature can convince the verifier Bob that it is generated by Alice since it should be verified using Bob's private key. In order to overcome the replay attack of ordinary designated verifier signature scheme, we propose a new ID-based strong designated verifier signature with time limit via the technology of signcryption. Owing to the fact that message and time stamp are embedded in the signature, only signer and designated verifier can recover them. Thus, the proposed scheme can resist universal attacks and replay attacks. Our scheme strengthens the security of Lee et al.'s scheme but lowers its efficiency. It is still an open problem to design the efficient and secure designated verifier signature schemes.
